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Abstract 
Invariant knowledge is widely considered an effective tool for social policy implementation. This 
approach is associated with a mode of thought that presupposes (at least) two assumptions: (1) that 
there exist stable causal factors, and (2) that only one kind of intervention - ex-ante - is relevant for 
an effective implementation. This paper presents a critique to these assumptions. In particular, it is 
shown that social processes do not fit the logic of stable causal factors, but they are more suited to 
the logic of "open-ended-results". On the basis of this ontological variation it will be argued that 
more than knowledge of invariant factors, the support for an effective policy must be sought in the 
blueprint constraints and in the possibility of their being satisfied in the target system. 
Furthermore, it will be shown that permanent interventions are more appropriate than ex-ante 
interventions for the social realm.  
Keywords: policy implementation; open-ended-results; invariance; nomological machines; 
intervention.  
 
POLÍTICA SOCIAL SIN INVARIANZA 
Resumen 
El conocimiento invariante es ampliamente considerado como una herramienta efectiva para la 
implementación de políticas sociales. Esta concepción está asociada con un modo de pensamiento 
que presupone (al menos) dos supuestos: (1) que existen factores causales estables, y (2) que solo un 
tipo de intervención -ex ante- es relevante para una implementación efectiva. Este artículo presenta 
una crítica a estos supuestos. En particular, se muestra que los procesos sociales no se ajustan a la 
lógica de los factores causales estables, sino a la lógica de "resultados de final abierto". Sobre la base 
de esta variación ontológica se argumentará que más que el conocimiento de los factores 
invariantes, se debe buscar el apoyo para una política efectiva en las restricciones del anteproyecto y 
en la posibilidad de que se satisfagan en el sistema objetivo. Además, se mostrará que las 
intervenciones permanentes son más apropiadas en el ámbito social que las intervenciones ex-ante.  
Palabras clave: implementación de políticas; resultados de final abierto; invarianza; máquinas 
nomológicas; intervención.  
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Introduction 
The use of invariant knowledge is a prerequisite for many manipulability 
approaches (see for instance Woodward, 2003; Cartwright, 2009b). This is because 
when an intervention is carried out we are expected to know what the result of 
manipulating a factor or set of factors will be, and without invariance such 
predictions seem to be practically impossible. Regarding the social sciences, this 
way of thinking presupposes that people’s actions are not only stable but also 
predictable. Such is not the case. The social realm is a world ruled by uncertainty, 
where the   formation of expectations may be substantially different for every 
individual, where contextual factors like the culture or the institutions have a large 
influence on the people’s decisions, etc. It is difficult to think that individual's 
activities are going to be stable, when such activities depend on a myriad factors, 
many of these volatile over time. 
If this is true, then it would be reasonable to think that social policies are 
meaningless. This is in some way congruent with the so-called "Lucas critique". 
According to Lucas, individual's behavior depends on the "rules of the game" of a 
socio-economic system. Should changes in these rules occur, then agents would 
modify their expectations and consequently their actions in order to adapt to the 
new situation. Nevertheless, many social policies are often successful, and those 
that end up failing do not fail because they did not make use of an invariant 
knowledge, but because there was no previous research of the system to be 
intervened carried out in an appropriate way (see Cartwright and Hardie, 2013). 
In this sense, the present paper aims to reflect both the kind of knowledge used for 
policy implementation purposes and the ways in which such interventions are 
carried out. It will be argued that theoretical knowledge provided by models may 
be considered as blueprints, where a set of conditions that limit the range of 
possibilities of a social system in order to achieve the desired result is specified. 
Following Bunge’s distinction (1997) between "conceptual system" and "concrete 
system", it will be shown that such knowledge is not about stable causal 
contributions, but rather about logical relations that could turn into causal 
relations as long as the gap between the conceptual and concrete systems is 
bridged. In addition to this, the problem of external validity – a classical problem 
concerning the use of knowledge (see Cartwright, 2007) – will be examined. In 
particular, it will be argued that knowledge provided by blueprints only concerns 
specific scenarios, so it is not advisable to extrapolate such information to other 
contexts where the restrictions specified in the blueprints are not met. Finally, it 
will be intended to shed light on the notion of “intervention”. In many 
philosophical approaches intervention is usually understood in two different ways: 
(1) as manipulations which aim to activate the triggering factors, and (2) as 
manipulations involved in the creation of a system which is expected to operate in 
a stable way. By contrast, in this paper it will be argued that a third kind of 
intervention must be taken into account: permanent or systematic interventions, 
that is to say, manipulations carried out during the course of the process. It is 
expected that such kind of intervention may end up leading to a better 
understanding of the system to be manipulated. 
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Invariant knowledge: a prerequisite for successful intervention 
In modern Philosophy of Science there exists some consensus on defending the 
idea that some kind of stable causal knowledge is needed for accomplishing 
interventionist purposes in general and for policy and planning in particular. 
Different ways of conceptualizing this knowledge have been offered. One of these 
is Nancy Cartwright’s “capacities” approach. Cartwright (1989) argues that the 
causal claims of science are not about regularities or constant conjunctions of 
events, but about adscription of capacities that underlie such phenomena. Broadly 
speaking, capacities are properties of entities or structures that contribute to the 
production of a result in a stable manner. Nevertheless, such a "contribution" 
should not be understood in law-like terms. When it is asserted that "aspirin has 
the capacity to relieve headaches", it is said that there exists an entity (aspirin) that 
has the property of producing a result (headache relief). This does not mean that 
aspirin always relieves headaches, or that it relieves headaches most of the time. 
Rather it is simply asserted that there exists a relatively enduring and stable 
capacity that an entity carries with itself from case to case (Cartwright, 1989). 
The other way Cartwright considers regular associations between properties can be 
found is through “nomological machines” (Cartwright, 1995, 1997, 1999). Because 
the world is both “messy” and “dappled”, constant conjunction of events are 
observable only in rare circumstances; those where a particular system of 
components is properly "shielded" from external influences. Cartwright calls it 
nomological machine, which is defined as “a fixed (enough) arrangement of 
components, or factors, with stable (enough) capacities that in the right sort of 
stable (enough) environment will, with repeated operation, give rise to the kind of 
regular behavior that we represent in our scientific laws” (Cartwright, 1999, p. 50). 
A good example of what a nomological machine is are vending machines. They are 
machines whose repeated functioning gives rise to a law or a regular association 
between properties. This process begins after the customer inserts currency or a 
token into the machine and selects the wanted article. There are a series of 
mechanical processes inside the machine that end up with obtaining the selected 
product. The “law” emerges from the satisfactory and repeated functioning of the 
vending machine: if X (the coin inserted) is to occur, Y (the good obtained) will 
take place. However, for this to happen, the machine must be shielded or isolated 
from anything that might disturb the internal operation. This is precisely what 
happens with a vending machine: the mechanism is shielded from several (though 
not all) types of external influences. 
Woodward (1996, 2002, 2003) has suggested a different way of conceptualizing this 
knowledge. According to the author, a successful intervention should be based on 
generalizations that describe patterns of counterfactual dependence of a particular 
class, which Woodward calls "active" (1996) or "interventionist" (2002) 
counterfactuals. For this to occur, the mentioned generalization must be invariant 
under interventions in the independent variables. 
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If a generalization is invariant, it means that it is stable under changes in certain 
conditions or circumstances. However, invariance is not per se sufficient for using a 
generalization for interventionist or political purposes. Instead, what is important 
is to obtain information that allows us to understand what would happen to the 
dependent variable once the independent variable was intervened physically 
(either by human agency or by a natural process). 
For instance, let’s suppose an equation where the rainfall is expressed in terms of 
the height of the mercury column in a barometer. Such equation will exhibit a 
regular behavior between the dependent and the independent variable. 
Nevertheless, it is not invariant under manipulations in the independent variable. 1 
In this juncture, Woodward asserts that the right way to recognize which 
generalization will be useful for interventionist purposes is through the 
justification of “active” (1996) or “interventionist” (2002) counterfactuals. Such 
counterfactuals involve hypothetical interventions: “If an intervention on X were to 
occur (such that the value of X was modified), it would produce a change in Y”. 
Thus, and contrary to the equation where the rainfall is expressed in terms of the 
height of the mercury column in a barometer, a regularity that may properly justify 
interventionist counterfactuals should exhibit a relationship between atmospheric 
pressure (independent variable) and the height of the mercury column of a 
barometer (dependent variable). This interventionist counterfactual would be 
expressed as follows: “If the atmospheric pressure was manipulated, the height of 
the mercury column in the barometer would change”. 
However, in some occasions invariant generalizations may not be the most reliable 
tool for policy purposes, because they provide "black box" explanations (Bunge, 
1997, 2004; Glennan, 2002; Hedström and Swedberg 1998b). We know what 
happens, but we do not know how it happens. The use of mechanisms would help 
to fill this gap. 
Broadly speaking, mechanisms make explicit two notions that are implicit in 
invariant regularities: activity and automaticity. In relation to the former, one of 
the most cited papers in the new mechanistic literature is Machamer, Darden and 
Craver (2000), where they define mechanisms as “entities and activities organized 
such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or 
termination conditions” (Machamer et al, p.3). According to Machamer et al, a 
mechanism is composed of both entities and activities. Activities are the producers 
of change. They are not a mere description of the kind of changes that occur, but 
they are in fact responsible, in a causal sense, of the changes that take place in a 
mechanism. Entities, on the other hand, are the things that engage in activities. 
Entities have specific properties that make possible the exercise of specific 
activities. 
Regarding the notion of automaticity, mechanisms are usually conceived as 
automatic processes: once the triggering factor has been activated, a sequence of 
                                               
1 For Woodward (2002, 2003), such manipulations must be understood in terms of human agency only in a 
“heuristic” sense. 
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events will take place until arriving at a known result. Only one type of 
intervention is required: a manipulation in the start or set-up conditions. In this 
sense, the concept of automaticity means that there is no need to intervene 
permanently in order to achieve a desired result. The effect of aspirin in the body is 
a good example. Aspirin inhibits the production of prostaglandins (substances that 
"inform" the nervous system of the presence of pain or discomfort in bodies). It 
brings about analgesic, anti-inflammatory and antipyretic effects. In this case, the 
intervention is just the ingestion of the aspirin. After this, a sequence will continue 
to hold until the final stage is reached. No other intervention is required during the 
sequence. Automaticity and activity are two concepts that go hand in hand. To the 
extent that activities are stable, the internal process of the mechanism will be able 
to operate without interruption until its final stage. In other words, the stability of 
activities is a necessary condition of mechanisms’ automaticity. 
 
An ontological problem: the open-ended results 
The use of stable or invariant causal factors entails a number of philosophical 
issues that should not be neglected when implementing a policy. On the one hand, 
there is an epistemological problem associated with the use of invariant knowledge 
for both predictive and interventionist purposes. Broadly speaking, this problem 
centers on the fact that the very discovery of invariant causal factors does not 
guarantee the success of a policy once these are “used” or implemented. Here there 
exists a clear problem of external validity which is associated with a lack of a 
"bridge" spanning the discovery of causal factors with their respective use. Without 
this bridge, there is no warranty that a causal factor will work in different 
circumstances or scenarios, regardless of its level of invariance (see Cartwright 
2007; Cartwright and Efstathiou, 2011).2 
Besides this epistemological problem, there is also an ontological problem: the 
difficulty of finding stable causal factors in the social sciences. Following the 
dualistic ontology proposed in Machamer, Darden and Craver (2000) and in 
Machamer (2004), causal relationships are mediated by activities. In the social 
realm, activities are plainly individuals’ decisions and actions. These activities are 
influenced by several factors like the socio-cultural sphere, the information agents 
receive from the world, the expectations they form about the evolution of certain 
variables, etc. Depending on what types of activities people carry out, different 
results will be obtained. Within this framework, an interesting difference in 
relation to Machamer et al and Machamer (2004) is evident. In those approaches 
activity refers to a "singular" notion: once a factor F is triggered, an activity A will 
start to operate. Such an activity is involved in the production of a result R. 
However, in the social sciences activities are not singular but “plural”: once a factor 
F is triggered, a set of potential activities (A1, A2,..., An) may start to work. Each of 
these activities is associated with the production of a different result (R1, R2, ..., Rn). 
                                               
2 Other approaches that examine such epistemological problem are the “Black Swan Theory" (Taleb, 2007) and 
de “Lucas Critique” (Lucas, 1976). 
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The prevailing result will depend on several factors, namely how people form their 
expectations, how they interpret the information from the economic and political 
world, the socio-cultural institutions, the changes in the social structure, etc. In 
other words, the basic structure of the social phenomenon responds to the logic of 
possibility trees or open-ended results: when a causal factor is activated, there are 
multiple possible decisions. Depending on which actions people carry out, 
different results will be achieved.  
In economics, a good example that represents the logic of these open-ended results 
is the so called "Keynes effect". According to this, an increase in money supply 
leads to a decrease in the interest rate, stimulating investment and consequently 
employment and production.  In some interpretations it is assumed that an 
increase in the quantity of money leads automatically and in a stable way to an 
increase in employment and production. However, this is not true. On the 
contrary, depending on the contextual framework and people’s interpretations and 
expectations, different paths are plausible in a social process. Aware of these 
limitations, Keynes says: 
“For whilst an increase in the quantity of money may be expected, cet. par.,  to 
reduce the rate of interest, this will not happen if the liquidity preferences of the 
public are increasing more than the quantity of money; and whilst a decline in the 
rate of interest may be expected, cet. par., to increase the volume of investment, 
this will not happen if the schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital is falling 
more rapidly than the rate of interest; and whilst an increase in the volume of 
investment may be expected, cet. par., to increase employment, this may not 
happen if the propensity to consume is falling off.” (Keynes, 1936, p. 155).” 
In the Keynes effect, economic variables are linked through people’s activities. In 
other words, these actions are responsible for enabling the causal link between 
economic variables. Nonetheless, people's activities are not linear, but they may 
change for lots of reasons. When this happens, a modification in the causal links 
will be observed. Since these changes are plausible, the feasibility of speaking 
about stable causal factors in the social realm can be put into question. 
Let's begin with the case of social capacities. When an entity or variable has a 
capacity, it means that there is a causal factor that, if properly exercised, 
contributes in a stable way to the production of an effect. However, this concept 
contrasts strongly with the idea that social phenomena depend on the 
interpretations agents make of the signals of the world, the background conditions, 
etc. If we understand the Keynes effect as a capacity, we could assert that "money 
supply has the capacity to increase the national income". But this is not the only 
possible result: an excess supply of money will not necessarily be associated with 
an increase in the demand for financial assets. It is plausible that such extra money 
may be used for increasing the demand of goods and services. In this case, a rise in 
the general level of prices is likely to occur. Finally, let’s assume another scenario 
where high uncertainty is what prevails. In such a case, the liquidity preference of 
the public will increase more than the quantity of money. If so, no changes in the 
macroeconomic variables will be observed. 
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The above example reveals that the rationale of the social capacities approach is 
different from the rationale of social phenomena. When a triggering factor is 
activated –in this case the money supply–, different capacities may be exercised: in 
one of the cases people increase the demand for goods and services; in another 
they increase the demand for financial assets; and in the latter case people end up 
hoarding the extra money. Thus, the ontology of social capacities should be 
replaced for an ontology of possibility trees or open-ended results. From this new 
perspective, money supply would have no predetermined capacity, but a set of 
potential contributions, which crucially depend on the multiple activities agents 
are able to perform. 
The analysis is similar for the case of mechanisms. There are two important 
features that were identified regarding the notion of mechanisms: activity and 
automaticity. Regarding the notion of activity, it was argued above that 
mechanisms exhibit a regular behavior precisely because their internal activities 
are stable. However, the internal activities of social processes are people’s 
activities, which are not necessarily stable. For instance, any change in the 
interpretation of the received signals can result in a significant change in the 
expectations formation, any institutional change can redirect the individuals' 
course of actions, etc. And since those activities are not necessarily stable, then 
social processes will not be so either: if the individuals’ interpretations of the signs 
of the world changed, this might cause modifications in the process of expectation 
formation; if an institutional change were to occur, people’s courses of action 
might be redirected to new paths; and so on.  
Since the idea of automaticity largely depends on the stability of the internal 
activities of a mechanism, it is doubtful that in the social realm the requirement of 
automaticity will be met. Quite the contrary: social processes may be both 
“interrupted” (e.g., they may be stopped at any of the intermediate stages of the 
estimated sequence), and “deviated” from the intended goal. The Keynes effect 
clearly illustrates this lack of automaticity in social processes. It is incorrect to 
assert that a positive change in the quantity of money will lead automatically to a 
decrease in the interest rate, to an increase in investment, and consequently to an 
increase in the level of employment and national income. Instead, according to the 
background conditions and to people’s interpretations and expectations, such 
process is apt to take different directions. 
With regard to invariant regularities, invariance is a factual possibility in a social 
system: to the extent that individuals are not systematically changing their 
decisions, that there is low volatility in the process of expectations formation, that 
the institutional arrangements are stable over time, etc., invariant regularities will 
be observed. An example of this is the economic phenomenon called "Phillips 
curve". Such phenomenon consists of a relationship between inflation and 
unemployment that has remained invariant under a wide variety of conditions for 
most of the nineteenth and twentieth century. However, in social phenomena any 
change in the expectations formation or in some macro-structural conditions can 
modify such regular behavior (which was in fact what happened in the 70's: the 
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agents changed their inflation expectations, and as a consequence the regularity 
between inflation and unemployment ended up disappearing).  
Finally, neither is the nomological machines approach adequate for understanding 
the ontology of social phenomena. In building a nomological machine it is 
necessary that its constituent elements be correctly assembled and protected from 
any perturbing factors, so that whenever X is to occur, Y will be the obtained 
result. However, social phenomena take place in open systems (see Lawson, 1997). 
That means any unexpected exogenous factor can disrupt the workings of the 
machine. In such systems what prevails is uncertainty, so we do not manage to 
know for sure what will happen in the near future. We can predict with some 
confidence the occurrence of certain events, but they are not guaranteed at all. 
Even worse, we do not even think about the factual possibility of a myriad of 
phenomena. If we are not able to know what factors are to occur in the future, then 
it seems inappropriate to pretend to shield a machine from unknown factors.  
Even if we assume the feasibility of shielding a social system, there is the chance 
that, because of "endogenous" problems, a nomological machine may yield 
unstable results. For instance, the Keynes effect may be understood as a 
nomological machine, provided that certain antecedent conditions are fulfilled. 
Let’s suppose that the policy maker has been doing everything he can to make it 
work in the real world. If so, then a high positive correlation between money 
supply and national income will be observed. However, let’s suppose now that, at 
some point during the year, a small group of businessmen believes that they could 
sell much less than expected, and because of this the level of investment decreases. 
Suppose further that this strategy spreads to other businessmen. The wider the 
scope, the greater the negative effect on employment and production. Clearly, such 
instability is not the result of failures in the shielding or in the assembling of parts. 
Rather, it has its origin in an "endogenous" problem. 
 
Blueprints as theoretical foundations for policy implementation 
It has been argued above that the logic of the open-ended results is not compatible 
with the logic of stable causal factors. In spite of this, social policies are in many 
situations successful, and such success is achieved without necessarily making use 
of an invariant knowledge. How is it possible? In the first place, a policy begins 
with designing a blueprint B. Based on a set of propositions P, an outcome R is 
inferred. Once the policy is implemented, R is expected to occur in the real world. 
According to the manipulability approaches mentioned above, the blueprint 
should involve the presence of stable causal factors. However, this is a somewhat 
risky position, because it is grounded on a mistaken ontological preconception: 
there are no stable contributions in the social realm, but open-ended results. 
Contrary to these approaches, blueprints may be thought as "clippings" or 
"closures" of a possibility tree: given the myriad of possible scenarios, a blueprint 
may be used both for knowing those conditions that lead to a certain result, and 
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for restricting the feasibility of other possible results. Likewise, it is highly probable 
that more than one path or alternative to get the final result may exist. Thus, there 
will be more than one blueprint that leads to the desired goal, and the policy 
maker will have to choose among them. For this to occur, he must examine which 
one best fits the scenario where the policy is expected to be implemented. By way 
of example, let’s suppose that government authorities want to increase the national 
income through an increase in the aggregate demand. One possible way is the 
Keynes effect: to the extent that the money supply is increased, a decrease in the 
interest rate will take place. This change will stimulate investment and 
consequently employment and production. Nonetheless, for this to happen certain 
conditions have to be met: that the increase in the liquidity preference is lower 
than the increase in the quantity of money, that entrepreneurs form good 
expectations about their future sells, that the marginal propensity to consume do 
not decrease, etc. If some of the conditions specified in the Keynes effect are not 
met in the real world, then the model will not be a good blueprint for this 
particular policy. Fortunately this is not the end of the story, but other ways can 
lead to an increase in national income. For example, if the marginal propensity to 
consume is high, then it is likely that government authorities design a 
blueprint/policy where aggregate demand will increase through an increase in 
consumption. Finally, if for different reasons this path is not feasible either, the 
policy maker can find a way through an increase in the public expenditure, as this 
is another component of the aggregate demand. 
What kind of knowledge do the blueprints provide? In what follows it is argued 
that such knowledge does not express a causal but a logical contribution. To justify 
this assertion, the Bunge's distinction between the conceptual and concrete system 
will be taken into account. According to Bunge, a concrete system is “a bundle of 
real things held together by some bonds or forces, behaving as a unit in some 
respects and (except for the universe as a whole) embedded in some environment” 
(Bunge, 1997, p.415). Natural, social and technical systems are concrete. In contrast, 
models, theories, classifications and codes are “conceptual systems”, and their 
bonds are not material or causal but logical. In concrete systems there are causal 
relationships between variables: we say that the increase in the quantity of money 
led to an increase in the national income, or that fexofenadine inhibited the 
production of histamine. All these are phenomena in which their parts are causally 
connected. However, in a conceptual system such relationships are not causal, but 
logical. For instance, let’s suppose the equation Y = 2X. Any value we assign to X, Y 
will always have the double. Nevertheless, there is no causal relation between X 
and Y; such relationship is merely logical.  
It is important to clarify the distinction between conceptual and concrete systems, 
since sometimes blueprints may be understood as thought experiments where one 
creates a model for discovering causal relationships in a theoretical way (see for 
instance Mäki, 1992, 2011; Cartwright, 2007). More precisely, if conceived as a 
causal contribution this could imply that, under very specific circumstances (e.g., 
in a laboratory experiment or in a nomological machine), C will necessarily 
produce R. And in a more general sense, C will contribute to bring about R, 
although there exists the possibility that R do not appear if a set of disturbing 
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factors occur. This is associated with the three-fold distinction of capacities 
(Cartwright, 1989, 2009a): (1) the obtaining of the capacity, (2) its exercise and (3) 
the manifest results. For example, the fact that money supply has the capacity to 
bring about changes in the national income is just an "ontological" issue: there 
exists the chance that no policy maker has ever taken the decision to increase the 
quantity of money in an economy. The capacity exists (or has been obtained, for 
that matter), but it has never been exercised. Likewise, a positive change in the 
quantity of money may be carried out. However, this does not guarantee an 
increase in the national income. In this case the capacity is exercised, but the 
manifests results do not take place at the level of events.  
Contrary to this, in the present paper it is argued that the contribution founded in 
the model or blueprint is purely potential: if the set of conditions C are met in the 
real world, an outcome R could emerge. When it is said that the contribution of C 
to R is potential, all we are saying is that the relationship between C and R is 
logical. However, there exists the chance that such relationship may become 
causal. For this to occur, the passage from the conceptual to the concrete system 
must be effective. In relation to this, it must be noted that what is asserted in the 
blueprint must be (approximately) met in the real world.3 For instance, if  a policy 
designed on the Keynes effect is expected to be implemented by the policy makers, 
then certain conditions (e.g., there are constant returns to scale, the marginal 
propensity to consume remains constant throughout the changes in income, 
changes in primary employment in the investment industries bring about 
proportionally greater changes in total employment, etc.) must be met.  
Therefore, we are not speaking about stable causal factors here, as may be the case 
that C does not contribute to R but to some other (perhaps undesired) result. The 
relationship becomes causal once the policy has been successful in its 
implementation. The relationship between money supply and national income 
postulated in the Keynes effect is only a logical connection; it will turn to a causal 
relationship when, once the policy has been implemented, a connection between 
money supply and national income is observed in the real world. Nevertheless, as it 
has been stressed in the present paper, the blueprint implementation does not 
guarantee achieving the desired result. The policymaker may fulfill the conditions 
specified in the Keynes effect. However, he cannot control each of the variables of 
the causal pathway between money supply and national income. Besides increasing 
the amount of money, the policy maker may create signals that lead to improve the 
entrepreneurs' expectations. Yet this is not a sure thing. The possibility tree of a 
social system is not only composed of decision nodes. There are also "random" 
nodes, in which the policy maker can do nothing but witnessing what the pathway 
of the social process will be.  
 
 
                                               
3 The term "approximately" is used because the blueprint restrictions are idealizations, and as such they cannot 
be fully reproduced in the real world. 
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The external validity of blueprints 
Social policy faces external validity problems. There is external validity when 
regardless the domain a certain result remains the same. The problem arises 
because nothing guarantees that such result maintains in different contexts from 
the context of discovery. In the case of the traditional manipulability approaches 
discussed above, we can say that the mere discovery of invariant causal factors 
does not guarantee the success of a policy once these are “used” or implemented. 
There exists a lack of a "bridge" linking the discovery of causal factors to their 
respective use. Without this bridge, there is no certainty that a causal factor will 
work in different circumstances or scenarios, regardless of its level of invariance 
(see Cartwright 2007; Cartwright and Efstathiou, 2011). 
The social policy blueprints mentioned in this paper also suffer from external 
validity problems. Blueprints specify a set of conditions that close the possibility 
tree. These conditions are imposed on the real world so that the desired result is 
achieved. Therefore, blueprints of social policy should not be considered as general 
hypothesis applicable to any scenario, but as models designed for specific 
situations: those where restrictions are met. The external validity of the blueprints 
is very narrow, but it is rightly so, since the blueprint is built for solving a specific 
social problem, not for providing a recipe that solve all social problems anywhere 
at any time. This idea is consistent with the approach proposed by Cartwright and 
Hardie (2013). According to them, when implementing a policy there are two types 
of causal claims: (1) those that provide information about a policy that works 
somewhere, and (2) those that provide information about a policy that will work for 
us. It is important to know how a policy has brought about an effect – that is to 
say, how it worked somewhere–. However, such information is about a causal factor 
that works under specific circumstances, so it does not follow that it will work in 
the target situation (that is to say, here or for us). 
In this regard, Cartwright and Hardie (2013) consider that for a policy to be 
effective here and now (for us), much more information is needed; not only about 
causal factors - or causal principles, for that matter - but also about the support 
factors that complement the information of causal principles. Such information 
may be obtained through what Cartwright and Hardie (2013) call the horizontal 
search. The horizontal search helps to find those components that are specific of 
the target situation. Cartwright and Hardie take as an example the nutritional 
programs implemented in Tamil Nadu and in Bangladesh. The Indian Tamil Nadu 
Integrated Proyect (TINP) was a program that had provided good evidence that a 
nutritional counseling program for mothers in the Indian state Tamil Nadu 
improved the nutrition of their young children. This program was based on the 
principle that nutritional counseling to mothers would improve their young 
children’s nutrition. Given the success in the TINP, a similar program was carried 
out in Bangladesh: the Bangladesh Integrated Nutrition Project (BINP). Yet this one 
did not attain the same results. Just like the TINP, the BINP provided nutritional 
counseling to mothers. However, contrary to Tamil Nadu mothers neither did the 
shopping – the men did it – nor controlled food distribution in the family – their 
mother-in-law did that.  
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The example of the nutritional programs illustrates why it is unadvisable to 
extrapolate a social policy to those scenarios that do not share similar attributes. 
The TINP was a program thought for solving malnutrition in Tamil Nadu, not for 
solving the universal problem of malnutrition. If we want to deal with malnutrition 
in other places like Bangladesh, Congo or Haiti we must carry out the horizontal 
search in each of them. As a matter of fact, it is likely that the program 
implemented in Haiti end up being quite different than the program implemented 
in Congo or Tamil Nadu.  
Since social policy blueprints make reference to set of restrictions that have to be 
met in the real world in order to achieve a result, then they should not be 
extrapolated to those scenarios where conditions are not met. Blueprints do not 
refer to a general hypothesis that are meant to be understood through a story. 
Understood as a blueprint, the Keynes effect is not a hypothesis that may be 
extrapolated  to any real-world scenario. There is a set of constraints that have to 
be met in order to reach a positive connection between money supply and national 
income. If these restrictions are not met (at least approximately), it would be 
illusory to think that increases in the amount of money lead to increases in 
national income. 
 
Three kinds of interventions  
According to the manipulability approaches discussed above there are two 
different ways in which the notion of intervention can be thought of: (1) as 
manipulations which aim to activate the triggering factors, and (2) as 
manipulations involved in the creation of a system which is expected to operate in 
a stable way. Regarding (1) the intervention is only meant to put into operation the 
capacity, mechanism, regularity or nomological machine that already exists in the 
real world. In relation to (2), the idea of intervention involves building a system 
that is not yet in the real world. It is the typical case of the nomological machines, 
where the intervention consists of assembling the machine and shielding it from 
disturbing factors. In either case, the idea of intervention turns out to be an ex-
ante concept:  once the mechanism, capacity, or nomological machine has been 
found (or constructed), its triggering factor is activated. After this, a sequence that 
leads automatically to an expected result will begin. 
However, as noted above, people’s activities may be both volatile and 
unpredictable. This means that any factor (both endogenous and exogenous) may 
prevent it from reaching the desired result. Therefore, and as far as social policy 
implementation is concerned, the ex-ante notion of intervention is incomplete. 
Interventions are crucial not only in the start conditions of a social process, but 
also in their intermediate stages. For instance, the Keynes effect takes place to the 
extent that the money supply is increased. Such intervention functions as a 
triggering factor. However, the system where the Keynes effect takes place is not 
"shielded" from external perturbing factors. This means that any factor is likely to 
bring about distortions, which could result in a deviation of the socioeconomic 
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process from the expected path. For example, it is possible that the marginal 
efficiency of capital decreases because some signals from the market bring about 
negative expectations of future sales. This difficulty may not have been foreseen by 
the policy makers, so they will probably have to intervene again through the 
generation of signals that lead to an improvement in the entrepreneurs’ 
expectations formation.   
Therefore, the notion of intervention should be understood in at least three 
different ways: (1) as activations of triggering factors, (2) as manipulations aimed to 
build stable systems and (3) as systematic manipulations. Traditional 
manipulability approaches assume the feasibility of stable causal factors, so they 
end up drawing analogies of interventions with vending machines (see for instance 
Cartwright, 2009b). But if socioeconomic processes are not the consequence of 
stable causal factors, then analogies should not be associated with vending 
machines, but with cases that involve permanent or systematic interventions, such 
as driving a car or coaching a team. It is undeniable that driving a car cannot be 
done without prior knowledge of the basic operations of the car (e.g., how to work 
the foot pedal or the shift lever). It is also important to bear in mind where to go, 
how to get there, etc. However, drivers face a world that to some extent is 
unknown. For instance, they do not know if a street of the route will be closed to 
traffic o if some mechanism of the car will break up; even less will they be able to 
predict all the other drivers' maneuvers of the same road, and so on. Because of 
that, drivers must intervene systematically. Similarly, a coach may design its “ideal” 
team. He may also have assistants who collect information about rival teams (e.g., 
players’ performances, usual tactics, etc.). However, once the game has kicked off 
things may not turn out as expected. The rival may try out a different tactic; 
players of his own team may be injured; others may be penalized. Unless we are 
clairvoyants, it is impossible for us to possess this knowledge beforehand. It is 
therefore natural that new interventions be carried out during the game. The same 
is valid when implementing a policy: despite having invested a great effort both in 
designing the blueprint and in collecting information about some specifications of 
the target system, unplanned events are bound to occur. When this happens, the 
policy maker will have to carry out new interventions. 
 
Conclusion 
Knowledge of invariant causal factors - conceptualized as capacities, regularities 
that support active counterfactuals, mechanisms or nomological machines - is of 
great interest for manipulability approaches because of its (apparent) reliability for 
policy implementation. The present paper proposes that in the social realm this 
way of thinking turns out to be problematic. Since the course of social processes or 
phenomena widely depend on people's activities -which in turn depend on their 
formed expectations, on structural factors and other constituents of people's 
decision-making - they should not be understood through the logic of stable causal 
factors but the logic of possibility trees or open-ended results. This means that 
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there is no single and predetermined social process, but a set of alternative 
processes where any course of action is plausible in principle. 
This does not mean that social policies do not make sense or that they are always 
unfruitful. Social policies can be successful, although the knowledge that 
substantiate them and the ways in which interventions are carried out must be 
pondered carefully. In this juncture, it has been argued that such knowledge is 
associated with social policy blueprints which, because they belong to the 
conceptual system, do not represent causal but logical relationships between 
variables (Bunge, 1997). More precisely, information provided by social policy 
blueprints is not about stable causal factors that already exist in the target system 
(and the policy maker need only make use of them), but about those logical 
relationships that could potentially become causal if a specific set of circumstances 
occurred in the real world. 
However, the very implementation of the blueprint in the real world is not enough 
for the success of a policy. The results will not be automatically obtained once all 
the blueprint restrictions are met. Quite the contrary, they must be managed 
through the creation of institutions and signals that lead to the formation of the 
desired expectations and decisions. For this reason, in this paper a new notion of 
intervention that involves not only ex-ante but also systematic manipulation has 
been proposed. 
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